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Abstract 
Vietnam has experienced a rapid growth in the dairy sector since 
the early 2000s. However, the organization of the sector is said to 
be inequitable and its motivational mechanisms are not sufficient 
to ensure the development of smallholder farmers. To assess small-
holders’ prospects in the upgrading process of the whole dairy 
sector, we conducted a study in Ba-Vì district, the largest “milk-
shed” in the Red River Delta, which has undergone a remarkable 
transition from state-owned concentrated production to small-
holder farms. The study focuses on value chain governance and 
upgrading strategies. The local dairy value chain is dominated by 
smallholders and characterized by contractual relations between 
private milk collectors and industrial, semi-industrial, and cottage 
processors. The local chain is featured by a mixed relational-cap-
tive governance pattern. Relational governance characterizes the 
two sub-channels in which small-scale industries operate. Captive 
governance describes the leading role of a medium-size dairy firm 
that has invested in UHT processing facilities and benefited from 
support from the local government. The strong role of public au-
thorities and some challenges for chain upgrading are discussed. 
Keywords:  dairy sector, value chain governance, livestock devel-
opment, Vietnam
Resumen
Vietnam ha tenido un crecimiento rápido en el sector lechero des-
de los primeros años de la década del 2000. Sin embargo, se dice 
que la organización del sector es inegalitaria y sus mecanismos 
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de motivación no son suficicientes para asegurar el desarrollo de 
granjas pequeñas. Para evaluar los prospectos de las granjas peque-
ñas en el proceso de renovación de todo el sector lechero, llevamos 
a cabo un estudio en el  distrito Ba-Vì, la región lechera más grande 
del delta del Río Rojo, que ha tenido una transición asombrosa: de 
producción concentrada y estatal, a granjas pequeñas. El estudio 
se enfoca en la gobernanza de la cadena de valor y en estrategias 
de renovación. La cadena de valor lechera local está dominada por 
granjas pequeñas y está caracterizada por relaciones contractuales 
entre recolectores de leche y procesadores industriales, semi-in-
dustriales y pequeños. La cadena local está ofrecida por un patrón 
de gobernanza relacional-captiva mezclada. La gobernanza rela-
cional caracteriza los dos subcanales dentro de los cuales opera la 
industria a pequeña escala. La gobernanza captiva describe el papel 
principal de una compañía lechera que ha invertido en plantas de 
procesamiento de UHT y se ha beneficiado del apoyo del gobierno 
local. El importante papel de las autoridades locales y algunos de-
safíos de la renovación de cadenas se discuten.
Palabras clave: Sector lechero, gobernanza de cadena de valor, de-
sarrollo de ganado, Vietnam
摘要 
自21世纪初，越南的乳制品行业已经历了迅速增长。然而，
该行业组织机构据说是不公平的，其激励机制不足以确保小
农的发展。为评估小农在整个乳制品行业升级过程中的前
景，本文在红河三角洲最大的“牛奶场区”（milkshed）—
巴维区—进行了一项研究。巴维牛奶场区经历了从国有集中
生产到小农生产这一巨大转变。研究聚焦于价值链治理和升
级策略。当地乳业价值链由小农主导,其特征表现为私人收
奶员和产业、半产业、以及农舍加工商之间的合同关系。当
地链的特点则是，（其治理模式是一种）由关系型和俘获
型共同存在的混合治理模式。关系型治理（Relational gover-
nance）是供小规模产业运作的两大子渠道的特点。俘获型治
理(captive governance)描述的是中型乳制品公司的主导角色，
这类公司拥有超高温加工设备，并从当地政府处获得支持。
本文探讨了公共权威的强有力作用以及价值链升级所面临的
挑战。
关键词：乳制品行业，价值链治理，畜牧业发展，越南
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Introduction 
The economic reforms that be-gan in Vietnam in 19864 affected agriculture and the whole agro-
food sector through land allocation to 
individual farmers, liberalization of ag-
ricultural production, and the gradual 
privatization of state-owned enterpris-
es (Dang 2009). The agricultural GDP 
grew annually by 4.2% and by 3.5% in 
the periods of 1986-2004 and 2005-2013 
respectively. The livestock sector has 
been particularly dynamic with an an-
nual growth of 5.3% for the 2005-2013 
period and, in 2014, represented 26.4% 
of agricultural GDP. Pig and poultry 
production accounted for 90% of live-
stock output (GSO 2014)5  while milk 
production has increased significantly, 
both in terms of the national dairy herd 
and of the average milk yield. The dairy 
herd quintupled from 41,241 to 227,020 
cows between 2001 and 2014, mainly on 
smallholder farms. During the same pe-
riod, milk production augmented from 
64,703 to 549,533 tons (DLP 2014)6. 
Economic growth induced higher de-
mand while enabling environment 
favored an increase in both milk pro-
duction and consumption7. National 
policies were promulgated to encourage 
the dairy sector, such as the Decision 
1678 supporting dairy development for 
the 2001-2010 period with a focus on 
4 The ‘Đổi Mới’ (Renovation) has moved Vietnam away from a centrally-planned economy to a “so-
cialist-oriented market economy”
5 General Statistics Office
6 Department of Livestock Production (under the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD))
7 Per capita milk consumption increased from 3.7 liters in 1995 to 20 liters in 2013 (FaoStat, 2014)
8 Decision 167/2001/QD-TTg of the Prime Minister (26th October  2001) 
9 MARD’s Decision n°984/QD-BNN-CN (2014) approving the “Restructuration of the livestock sec-
tor towards improvement of added value and sustainable development”
smallholder production. In 2011, 90% 
of all dairy cows were raised on small 
farms of less than 20 cows. Larger dairy 
farms were formed out of partially and 
progressively privatized state agro-for-
estry farms (FCV 2011).
Despite these improvements, 
the dairy industry only satisfies 30% of 
domestic demand (DLP 2014), and the 
remaining demand is covered by im-
ported milk powder and dairy products 
worth US$1,097 million in 2014 (Viet-
nam Custom 2015). The new livestock 
development policy (2014)9 gives prior-
ity to the development of large commer-
cial farms. While some authors report 
efforts by large dairy corporations to 
exclude small-scale vendors and fam-
ily farms from value chains in devel-
oping countries (GRAIN 2011), others 
highlight the complementarity between 
firm-led governance and contracted 
smallholder farmers (Humphrey and 
Memodovic 2006). 
This paper aims at characteriz-
ing the governance pattern of the local 
dairy value chain, and linking the gov-
ernance to the economic performance 
and development of the chain. The re-
spective roles of private firms and of 
government in value chain governance 
are explored to assess current upgrad-
ing trajectories and future prospects for 
smallholder dairy production.
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Materials and Methods
Value chain governance and 
determinants of governance 
patterns: an integrated approach
The emergence of governance in economics is linked to integra-tion of international trade and 
disintegration of production (Feenstra 
1998). As production is increasingly 
fragmented across geographical space 
and between firms, many studies focus 
on how these fragmentations are coor-
dinated and exchanged (Gereffi et al. 
2005). While some economists see mar-
ket coordination in governance pat-
terns, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) 
refer to governance as any coordina-
tion of economic activities “through 
non-market relationships”. This relates 
to various ways of steering activities 
that are embedded in value chains, not 
only networks but also more hierarchi-
cal forms. Between the two extremes of 
market and hierarchical governance, 
three governance modes are identified: 
“modular”, “relational” and “captive” 
(Gereffi et al. 2005). In these three gov-
ernance modes, lead firms exert their 
power by coordinating production vis-
à-vis suppliers without direct owner-
ship of the firms. In agribusiness value 
chains, such patterns include out-grow-
er schemes, contract farming, category 
management by supermarket suppliers, 
marketing contracts, and farmer coop-
eratives (Humphrey and Memodovic 
2006; Moustier 2010). These forms of 
coordination influence the costs of gov-
ernance through their effects on the 
complexity of transactions, the codifi-
ability of transactions, and the capabil-
ities of the suppliers required for a spe-
cific transaction. 
The global value chain approach 
(GVC) draws on Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics (TCE) and Network theories, 
while focusing on the internal logics 
of sectors, such as industrial structure 
and production-process characteristics 
(Bair 2005). The TCE framework pro-
vides insights into the factors that deter-
mine value chain governance patterns 
by convening the effect of transaction 
characteristics (asset specificity, uncer-
tainty and transaction frequency) and 
the associated transaction costs (both 
ex-ante and ex-post costs of contract-
ing) (Williamson 1979). This approach 
argues that increases in uncertainty 
and the risks of opportunism result 
in greater use of complex contracts or 
vertical integration (Williamson 1991). 
Complementarily, Network theorists 
propound that problems as contractu-
al hazards need to be managed at the 
inter-firm level through social mecha-
nisms, i.e. trust, trustworthiness, rep-
utation, norms, mutual dependence 
and information exchange (Powell 
1989; Jones et al. 1997) that are called 
‘mundane’ transaction costs (Gereffi et 
al. 2005). Institutional economists also 
suggest that such formal and informal 
institutions are “embedded” in their 
cultural and social environment. Hence, 
they underline historical processes and 
path-dependency by which specific in-
stitutional arrangements emerge in a 
given context (North 1990). Different 
forms of social embeddedness raised 
by network theory refer to the concept 
of ‘proximity’ which valorizes the re-
What shapes the governance of the dairy value chain in Vietnam? 
Insights from Ba-Vì milkshed (Hanoi)
61
sponse to market demand of arrange-
ments and connections among actors 
engaged in the value chain (Moustier 
2012). Recent literature highlights three 
levels of proximity: physical proximity 
(Gilly and Torre 2000), organizational 
proximity (Torre 2000), and functional 
proximity (Gereffi et al. 2005).
Governance arises when “some 
firms in the chain work to parameters 
set by others” (Humphrey 2005). A 
lead producer or a lead buyer play an 
important role in setting and enforcing 
parameters (product, process, logistic 
parameters) because they have a strong 
position in “core nodes” of the chain 
that allows them to extract different 
types of rents (Gereffi 2001; Humphrey 
and Schmitz 2002). The “captain” of 
the chain can be identified by key in-
dicators: (i) share of chain sales, value 
added, and profits; (ii) relative rate of 
profit; (iii) share of chain buying pow-
er; (iv) control over key technology; (vi) 
holder of distinctive competence; and 
(vii) holder of chain “market identity” 
(brand-name) (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2012). 
The GVC framework, which 
has mostly been used for international 
chains, puts forward that increasing de-
mand for quality and competition be-
tween firms translate into a shift from 
market to captive governance, driven by 
processing and retailing firms. From the 
literature on milk chains in emerging 
economies, it is hypothesized that milk 
chains tend to be steered by processing 
firms that place large-scale investments 
in processing and quality control, and 
develop contracts with farmers, those 
are provided with intermediate goods 
and technical assistance, in exchange of 
commitments to deliver milk. This has 
been evidenced in Brazil, Chile and Ar-
gentina (Reardon and Berdegué 2002); 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (Dries 
et al. 2009); India (Birthal et al. 2009). 
The governance of chains through con-
tracts can be described as modular or 
captive depending on the asymmetry 
of power between suppliers and buyers 
and the strictness of contracts. In India, 
cooperatives facilitate farmers’ access 
to services and markets, that some-
how balances the power of industrial 
plants (Upadhyay and Ranjan 2007). In 
the quoted studies, contracted farmers 
benefit from higher profits and pric-
es thanks to quality premiums. Public 
and private standards and services are 
described as complementary. In the 
paper, we consider if similar trends are 
observed in Vietnam through variables 
characterizing the governance (Table 1). 
We also assess the main economic re-
sults of the chain and ongoing upgrad-
ing strategies. Finally, our discussion of 
the role of public services contributes 
to the debate on livestock development 
policies.
Study zone
Ba-Vì district, located 60km from Hanoi center, is the largest milk-shed in the Red River Delta and 
includes a cluster of small farms that 
typically supply both regional and local 
markets (Hostiou et al. 2012). The dairy 
farms are mostly smallholding with 
fewer than 10 cows fed with less than 1 
hectare of elephant grass, corn, or other 
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forage. In 2014, the district dairy herd 
numbered 8,871 cows for a total milk 
production of nearly 30,000 tons (Fig-
ure 2). The development of smallholder 
dairying contributes to improved rural 
livelihoods through income generation, 
employment opportunities and better 
nutrition (Nguyen et al. 2013). How-
ever, the presence of industrial dairy 
processing companies, which have 
made well-targeted investments in the 
dairy chain, and cottage industry raises 
concerns about the effective and sus-
tainable governance of the local value 
chain (Duteurtre et al. 2015). The roles 
of public services and private firms in 
sustaining transactions and linkages 
between actors are thus of particular at-
tention in this paper.
Table 1: Variables to be analyzed in value chain governance
Source: Authors’ synthesis adapted from TCE, Network Theory and the CGV approach
Variables
Governance pattern
Market Modular Relational Captive Hierarchy
Term of the 
relation
Short-term 
orientation
Medium/ 
Long -term 
orientation
Long-term 
orientation
Long-term 
orientation
Long-term 
orientation
Information 
exchange Limited Frequent Frequent
Frequent and 
idiosyncratic
Frequent and 
idiosyncratic
Enforcement 
mechanism Price
Standards 
and 
information
Social 
embeddedness
Parameters 
set by lead 
firm
Parameters 
set by lead 
firm
Dependence 
level Independent
Inter- 
dependent
Inter-
dependent
Inter-
dependent Dependent
Power 
asymmetry No Low Low High High
Physical 
proximity Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Organizational 
proximity Yes/No Yes/No Yes Yes/No Yes/No
Functional 
proximity Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes
Captain of the 
chain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/ 
Downstream/
No captain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/ 
Downstream/
No captain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/  
Downstream/
No captain
Upstream/ 
Intermediate/ 
Downstream/
No captain
Parent firm
Complexity of 
transaction Low High High High High
Codification of 
information High High Low High Low
Competence of 
suppliers High High High Low Low
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Data and analysis
The secondary data (socio-eco-nomic, agriculture, etc.) from the target district and com-
munes were collected to picture the lo-
cal dairy sector. We mapped the dairy 
channels using the value chain scoping 
exercise developed by ILRI (ILRI 2014) 
and focused on the three communes 
of Tản-Lĩnh, Vân-Hòa and Yên-Bài, 
which together represent 80% of the 
milk production in the district. Seven-
ty people involved in dairy production 
and marketing in Ba-Vì were invited to 
focus-group discussions. Three main 
Figure 1: Map of study site
Figure 2: Increase in the dairy cow herd in Ba-Vì
Source: Economic Division, Ba-Vì district, 2014
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channels were identified corresponding 
to three types of processing: artisanal, 
small-scale, and large-scale. 
An in-depth survey was se-
quenced in September 2014 (50 inter-
viewees) and September 2015 (20 inter-
viewees) comprising semi-structured 
interviews with different actors in the 
local chain (local authorities, 5 input 
and service suppliers, 21 producers, 9 
collectors, 5 processors, 10 milk shops 
and 15 consumers) to characterize the 
value chain and scrutinize sustainabil-
ity of the value chain. Given this small 
sample, the study should be considered 
as exploratory and the results have to be 
supported by a quantitative survey. Yet, 
some representativeness was sought 
in targeted interviewees according to 
their involvement in the three identi-
fied channels steered by the processors. 
Local actors were questioned about 
their business resources (assets, capi-
tal, know-how, labor, technology used), 
functions and activities (products pur-
chased or sold, delivery and transport, 
services provided or received, access 
to credit, information exchange), eco-
nomic results and management prob-
lems (prices of inputs and outputs, costs 
and margins, regulations, competition, 
strategy), relationship with other chain 
actors (contractual linkages, alliances, 
dependence, groups or associations, 
market relationships, information, 
power asymmetry, proximity), quality 
management (types of products, quali-
ty standards, payment schemes, quality 
labelling, certification), enabling envi-
ronment and supports from local gov-
ernment (technical assistance, exten-
sion services, livestock insurance, etc.). 
Possible changes over time of these 
variables were collected to grasp the 
dynamics of the whole system. Down-
stream flows from milk production to 
milk processing to end-use activities 
were traced to identify the drivers of in-
novations and who received the largest 
share of the margins and value addition 
produced by the chain.
Results
The dairy development trajectory 
in Ba-Vì
Milk production started in Ba-Vì in the early 20th century. The  development trajectories 
of Ba-Vì’s dairy sector correspond with 
the national trends in the periodized 
political economy (Figure 3): milk pro-
duction concentrated on State farms 
(during the collectivism period), milk 
production on individual smallholder 
farms (during the Đổi Mới period) (Su-
zuki et al. 2006), and industrialization 
of the private dairy sector (since 2008) 
(Duteurtre et al. 2015).
The recent industrialization shift 
of the local dairy production has turned 
out since the Government launched its 
2020 livestock development strategy in 
2008. In the same year, the melamine 
crisis caused by adulterated powder 
milk imported from China hit the local 
chain as some local firms had to sus-
pend their milk collection and to stop 
their processing activities. Among the 
processing companies involved in the 
collection of local milk, only Interna-
tional Dairy Products Joint-Stock Com-
pany (IDP) and Bavi Milk JSC. (BVM) 
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continued to buy fresh milk from local 
farmers, resulting in a concentration of 
the dairy industry. IDP built a new dairy 
processing plant (2010) next to Ba-Vì 
Cattle and Forage Research Center10 
(CFRC) in Tản-Lĩnh commune, and 
extended its collection network. These 
investments were further valorized and 
secured by a memorandum of under-
standing (MOU) between IDP and the 
district authorities. IDP then adopted a 
2012-2020 dairy development program 
aiming at expanding local milk pro-
duction through credit to farmers, im-
proved breeding, new production tech-
niques, supports for an industrial-scale 
“demonstration farm”, and building an 
animal feed mill. 
10 In 1989, Ba-Vì State farm was converted to Cattle and Forage Research Center with mandates to 
conduct research into cow breeding and feeding, animal health and reproduction, and forage culti-
vation
Characterization of the Ba-Vi 
dairy value chain 
The Ba-Vi dairy value chain in-cludes five segments: supply of inputs, milk production, milk 
collection, milk processing, and mar-
keting and distribution of dairy prod-
ucts (Figure 4).
Input and service provision: 
Farmers have their inputs sourced from 
either self-supplied stock, mostly green 
fodder (representing about 50% of the 
farms’ feed requirements), or external 
inputs purchased off-farm (industrial 
feed, artificial insemination, veterinary 
services, etc.). Beside the network of 
private veterinarians, local producers 
Figure 3: Dairy production development trajectories in Ba-Vì
Source: Authors
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receive support from extension agents, 
who implement technical assistance 
programs launched by the local govern-
ment and the Hanoi Livestock Devel-
opment Center (HNLDC). The wom-
en’s union, the farmers’ association, and 
private collectors initiate and contract 
credits to producers with funds from 
the IDP, commercial banks and (in 
the case of the associations) their own 
members’ savings.
Dairy farming: Milk production 
in Ba-Vì is done on small farms of 0.5-
1 hectare (Pham et al. 2011). Regard-
ing feed availability, a “typical” family 
farm with three dairy cows has around 
3000m2 (around 60% of its cultivated 
land) under forage crops. Both farms 
diversified in crop-livestock produc-
tion and farms specialized in milk pro-
duction target stable markets based on 
contracts with industrial and semi-in-
dustrial processors. Some rely on verbal 
agreements with small-scale processors 
and cottage industry, who generally buy 
milk on a less strict quality at higher 
price but at a very limited volume.
Milk collection: Collectors are 
crucial middlemen who greatly con-
tribute to the organization of local milk 
Figure 4: Ba-Vì dairy value chain
(Note: solid lines represent normative relationship; dash line illustrates non-regular re-
lationship happening in winter when the surplus volume unabsorbed by semi-industrial 
processors (given their limited processing capacity) are sold to IDP)
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
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production and marketing. The collec-
tion of fresh milk anchors on annual 
contracts or verbal agreements with 
fixed prices, or spot market exchanges. 
Out of 44 local collection points, IDP 
has the largest network (32 stations) 
and buy up 85% of total district out-
puts. Most collection stations belong 
to private collectors who are supported 
by the companies for credit access and 
the provision of equipment and know-
how. All private collectors are part of 
the IDP milk payment scheme, which 
gives premium to high quality milk. 
The companies grade the milk deliv-
ered by producers through monthly 
quality analysis. The CFRC organizes 
its own collection network involving 
their contracted farmers11 and then 
sells the milk to IDP. Semi-industrial 
processors also rely on collection points 
where they buy 6% of all the fresh milk 
produced locally. Business relations be-
tween producers and semi-industrial 
processors stand on verbal agreements 
through those collection points. Most 
of the collection points are located 
along main roads to reduce time spent 
on transport from farms to the pro-
cessing plants.
Processing: Eighteen registered 
milk processors operate in Ba-Vì. How-
ever, 93% of the milk is processed by two 
industrial processors (IDP and BVM) 
who produce a wide range of industri-
al products. IDP is the only processor 
to use the UHT technology. Around 
6% of the milk is processed by semi-in-
dustrial processors (Ba-Vì Milk Cake 
- BVMC, Ất-Thảo, Xuân-Mai, etc.), the 
11 CRFC’s contracted farmers are those perform dairy activities based on rental leasing contracts. 
Some of their cows and all their land are leased from the CFRC. 
rest is processed by small cottage pro-
cessors. The semi-industrial and small 
processing units produce pasteurized 
milk, milk cakes, caramel cream, and 
yoghurts. 
Marketing and distribution of 
dairy products: Increasing income, 
rapid urbanization, changing diet 
habits have driven the increased milk 
consumption in Vietnam. The strong 
territorial identity of Ba-Vì (nature, 
tradition, culture, know-how) and 
quality label (certification trademark) 
spur the preference of consumers for 
Ba-Vì milk products. Industrialized 
products are sold by modern distribu-
tion (supermarkets, convenient stores) 
and shops mostly outside the district, 
particularly in Hanoi, whereas the 
semi-industrial and artisanal prod-
ucts are sold locally to tourists in small 
shops located along highways connect-
ing Ba-Vì and Sơn-Tây town and to 
Ba-Vì national park. 
Family farming is still secure 
thanks to major constraints on access 
to land and capital, which precludes the 
development of large industrial farms. 
Landless and labor-intensive milk pro-
duction have allowed smallholders to 
stabilize their business and guarantee 
economic returns to family labor. Writ-
ten contracts with milk collectors are 
underlined in controlling price fluctu-
ations and enforcing contractual link-
ages between producers and processing 
companies. 
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The mixed governance pattern of 
the Ba-Vì dairy value chain
Importance of product characteristics 
in the governance of the local value 
chain
Coupled with the functional charac-
teristics of chain actors, the technical 
properties of the milk products affect 
inter-firm relationships and governance 
patterns. First, the perishability of raw 
milk and unsterilized dairy products lo-
calizes collecting and processing facili-
ties close to production areas. This per-
ishability restricts marketing flexibility 
for farmers and traders but increases 
their marketing risks. Marketing fresh 
milk products is thus characterized by 
physical proximity and contractual re-
lationships, whereas sterilized prod-
ucts can be sold very far away through 
market adjustments. Second, seasonal 
variation in milk production and con-
sumption raises concerns about the ad-
justment of milk collection, processing 
and storage, and more generally about 
balancing supply and demand. This sea-
sonality creates trading risks for farm-
ers, puzzles cost-efficient utilization of 
labor and processing facilities and com-
plicates the structure of products for 
processors. IDP upgraded its process-
ing line to diversify its products and to 
handle the abundance of raw milk in the 
off-season and contracted to purchase 
surplus milk from external collection 
points of semi-industrial processors 
and cottage industry. The UHT line 
installed in 2010, which manufactures 
storable dairy products, plays a signifi-
cant role in this respect. Third, although 
milk is a relatively homogeneous prod-
uct, its nutrient content varies consid-
erably among producers, upon cow 
breed, feeding, and farm management 
practices. The heterogeneous quality re-
quires significant investments and extra 
costs for grading, especially measuring 
the fat and dry matter content of the 
milk procured. 
 
Relational governance: linkage 
between dairy farmers and collectors
The governance of the milk collection 
schemes is mainly relational. Linkages 
between farmers and collectors are de-
fined by physical proximity, organiza-
tional proximity and functional prox-
imity (Table 2).
Table 2: Characterization of transactions determining proximity 
between farmers and collectors
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
Type of proximity Characteristics of transactions 
Physical proximity Distance between farmers and collection points is less than 2 km
Organizational 
proximity
Family relationships between producers and collectors
Moral factors that shape mutual confidence
Functional proximity Agreed sharing of collection areas between collectors (and 
processors)
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Besides the proximity of col-
lecting points and milk producers, 
processing facilities have been built in 
the district to ensure just-in-time pro-
cessing. Collection points of indus-
trial processors are installed along the 
main roads to enable access by big tank 
trucks, whereas the collection points of 
semi-industrial processors settle farther 
away. While most of dairy farmers de-
liver their milk to the collection points 
within their village, some farmers fetch 
milk to collection points of another vil-
lage because of social connections. The 
social proximity reduces uncertainties 
related to price, quality, and quantity 
while enables access to informal credit, 
information, and knowledge. 
Collectors bridge farmers and 
companies through formal contracts. 
The bilateral contracts between farm-
ers and processors refer to the collec-
tor’s name and are signed at collector’s 
place. As the collector is responsible 
for managing and enforcing the con-
tracts, actors consider those contracts 
as “tri-party” agreements. Beside terms 
regulating rights and responsibilities of 
farmers and processors, the contract 
defines different tasks performed by 
the collector (delivering milk to the 
factory, sampling milk for quality test, 
proceeding payments, etc.). However, 
the one-year term implies contractu-
al ties not being the only institution 
to ensure the regularity of milk deliv-
ery and the loyalty of the producers. 
There is always a risk that a farmer will 
switch from one collector to another 
12 Equivalent: US$1,000–US$2,500 
13 “Red Book” is the Land Use Right Certificate delivered by local administration
when the contract ends. Thus, financial 
and moral aspects as well as interper-
sonal proximity enforce the contract. 
Trust between farmers and collectors 
is sustained by other supports: credit 
at low interest rates to farmers to buy 
cows or to build facilities (VND 20-50 
million12 for a term of 6 to 12 months 
with extension possibility), or advanc-
es (VND 1-3 million) for the purchase 
of feed, which farmers can reimburse 
in milk. Since farmers find it difficult 
to access to formal credit provided by 
banks (due to the high interest rate, ab-
sence of mortgages or collateral assets 
such as Red Book13), financial support 
from collectors has largely contrib-
uted to the local dairy development. 
Connections between collectors and 
farmers hang on social principles and 
on events taking place in the villages 
and communes (weddings, funerals, 
house-warming, religious events, etc.). 
Milk collectors strengthen their rela-
tionship with farmers by buying milk 
of lower quality rejected by the proces-
sors (in this case, milk is bought at a 
lower price for feeding young calves), 
delivering veterinary services free of 
charge, providing technical assistance 
and information or giving bonuses for 
milk delivered. These incentives are 
regarded as tools for collectors’ trans-
actional assurance and improving milk 
quality (Saenger et al. 2013). Other at-
tributes of relational governance are 
evidenced by frequent information 
exchanges between dairy farmers and 
milk collectors. Any changes in the 
policy or strategy of processing compa-
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nies, or price fluctuations are passed to 
farmers by collectors. Milk collectors 
are obliged to invest their time and re-
sources in building such networks, but 
they themselves benefit from relational 
governance in two ways: (i) it enables 
them to expand their input business 
(feed, animal medication); (ii) they are 
able to obtain necessary information to 
reduce risks connected with milk qual-
ity at farm level. The above-mentioned 
legal and social mechanism facilitates 
the symmetric relationship between 
dairy producers and collectors. 
 
Captive governance: outstanding role 
of IDP as lead firm
Different from the informal link be-
tween farmers and cottage industry, 
mixed connection between farmers 
and semi-industrial processors, the re-
lationship between farmers and IDP is 
formal. Facilitated by the MOU with 
the district authority (2009), IDP has 
a quasi-monopoly in purchasing local 
milk as IDP collects 85% of the milk 
locally produced and imposes pur-
chase prices and the quality norms 
(dry matter content, fat content, an-
tibiotics, etc.) that are a reference for 
the whole district. Semi-industrial 
processors organize their collection 
and price their purchases based on 
the price range defined by IDP. Both 
the pricing and the payment system 
(penalty, bonus, and quality standard) 
are decided by IDP without formal 
discussions with the farmers, who are 
in a weak position in the chain. Dairy 
farmers are not organized to benefit 
from collective actions, and are thus 
unable to exert power or negotiate the 
milk prices and other concerns. Dairy 
farmer groups are established in only 
three out of seventeen dairy farming 
communes. Except for technical train-
ing classes and visits to farmers, these 
groups don’t have any collective activ-
ities (as bulk purchase of inputs) or 
action plan to dialogue and negotiate 
with the processors.
IDP drives the technological ad-
vances in local industry by investing in 
UHT technology. This investment al-
lows IDP to produce pasteurized long-
life milk, which helps balance supply 
and demand in winter, and target larger 
markets outside the district (i.e. Hanoi 
city and even Central and Southern 
provinces). Moreover, IDP has built 
up professional teams for the different 
stages (collection, processing and sale) 
to provide technical assistance to their 
farmers and collectors. Besides, IDP 
commits short-term and medium-term 
credit to the farmers linked to their net-
work. While formal bank loans usually 
require collateral, informal loans and 
microfinance enable dairy farmers to 
purchase cows or make other invest-
ments. 
IDP officializes its operations 
by contractual relationships with pro-
ducers and private collectors aiming at 
securing supplies and reducing risks. 
The written contract system has been 
in use since IDP’s debut in the region. 
Today, most local producers have a 
contractual link with a processor (large 
or small, industrial or semi-industrial), 
although a small number of producers 
supply their milk to cottage industry 
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without written contracts. Under the 
contract terms, together with techni-
cal aspects, hygiene requirements, and 
respecting sanitary norms, IDP agrees 
to buy all milk that meets quality cri-
teria. The penalty and bonus policy is 
also defined by quality attributes. IDP 
encourages farmers to produce quality 
milk by offering premiums tied to the 
milk quality and quantity. Other bo-
Table 3: Specifications of governance patterns in the local dairy value chain
Variables Relational Governance Captive Governance
Term of relation Long-term orientation Long-term orientation
Information 
exchange
Frequent information ex-
change between producers and 
collectors (at collecting points, 
social events, etc.)
The connection between dairy 
farmers and processing compa-
nies is created and maintained 
by a network of collectors
Enforcement 
mechanism
Social relations between dairy 
farmers and collectors are 
driven by relational linkage, 
mutual trust 
The terms and conditions in the 
contract between dairy farmers 
and processing companies con-
cern the milk that is purchased 
and processed 
Dependence 
level
Inter-dependence of farmers 
and collectors
Inter-dependence of collectors 
and processors (processing com-
panies)
Power 
asymmetry
Relatively balanced/symmetric 
partnership between farmers 
and collectors
Farmers are highly dependent on 
processing companies who de-
cide on the required milk quality 
and purchase price.
Captain of the 
chain 
IDP IDP
Complexity of 
the transaction
Tri-party milk procurement 
contract
Tri-party milk procurement con-
tract
Codification of 
information
Norms and standards to en-
sure the quality of milk to be 
collected and processed
Norms and standards to ensure 
the quality of milk to be collect-
ed and processed
Certification trademarks are 
granted to 2 local processors 
(IDP and BVM)
Competences of 
suppliers
Improvement in technical 
knowledge and economic sit-
uation thanks to training and 
credit 
Improvement in technical 
knowledge and economic sit-
uation thanks to training and 
credit 
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
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nuses are awarded for respecting the 
code of practice (certified by IDP), use 
of tanks and equipment for transport-
ing milk, and compliance with farm 
sanitary standards. A stable year-round 
purchase price discourages farmers 
from switching to another processor. 
Although the prices set by IDP are 
somewhat lower than cottage indus-
try on spot market, farmers appreciate 
selling to IDP because of regular milk 
purchase during year. Along with the 
quality-based payment, IDP frequently 
monitors compliance of its contract-
ed farmers with hygienic and farming 
practices. Captive governance led by 
IDP, on the one hand, has contributed 
to the rapid adoption of the Code of 
practice at the farm level and, in turn, 
to the company’s success in creating 
a stable source of raw material for its 
large-scale processing. On the other 
hand, under this governance pattern, 
by founding a decentralized collec-
tion network, IDP aims at reducing its 
transaction costs (particularly search, 
screening and transfer costs) since 
third-party collectors take over coor-
dinating exchanges with small farmers. 
Yet, the costs of monitoring and enforc-
ing the contracts with dairy farmers, in 
particular supervision of husbandry 
practices and control of milk quality, 
are still relatively high since most  local 
producers are smallholders spreading 
out over a large area. 
The milk chain is therefore char-
acterized by a two-facet governance 
(Table 3): relational governance be-
tween farmers and collectors, and cap-
tive governance between farmers and 
IDP, the industrial processing firm. 
Figure 5: Distribution of profit and added value among actors in the dairy value chain
Source: RUDEC’s survey (Revalter, 2014-2015)
What shapes the governance of the dairy value chain in Vietnam? 
Insights from Ba-Vì milkshed (Hanoi)
73
Economic performance of the 
value chain
Economic returns for chain stakeholders reflect chain op-erations and forms of gover-
nance. The unequal distribution of 
the profit and value added highlights 
the supremacy of processors, espe-
cially IDP, in the local dairy chain 
(Figure 5). IDP takes the largest 
share (63.77%) of the profit, where-
as farmers receive less than one-third 
(26.01%) of the total profit made in 
the chain, which is disproportionate 
with respect to their investment costs 
(which account for up to 50% ex-
penses of the chain as a whole). The 
dairy value chain is a typical chain in 
which the processors lead the chain 
forward, and the majority of added 
value of the chain is subsequently 
captured by processors like IDP. This 
asymmetric distribution has weak-
ened the bargaining power of the 
dairy farmers. It is prevailing that all 
investments made by the processors 
(even small) are counted in their pro-
duction costs and value addition. On 
the contrary, family labor, self-sup-
ply of grass for feed, and opportunity 
costs are neglected in earnings ob-
tained by the farmers. If all costs were 
included, the added value gained by 
dairy farmers in the chain would be 
significantly lower. This unequal dis-
tribution proves the captive gover-
nance led by IDP, but raises concerns 
about the sustainable development of 
the dairy sector in general and of the 
dairy chain in Ba-Vì in particular.
Enabling environment: the role 
of public services in value chain 
governance
Following the National Dairy De-velopment Plan (2001), a num-ber of research and scientific 
efforts were made in the dairy sector 
with the participation of international 
development actors. CFRC strength-
ened its research activities through 
government funds and internation-
al research and development (R&D) 
projects (JICA-funded dairy projects, 
Vietnam-Belgium Dairy project, the 
establishment of Moncada frozen se-
men centre, etc.). The international 
R&D projects built capacity for the lo-
cal farmers and collectors as well as em-
powered the CFRC and contributed to 
transform its role from production de-
velopment to the scientific research and 
technical consulting.
The dairy production in Ba-Vì is 
high on the agenda of Hanoi’s rural and 
agricultural development strategy. Many 
actions have been done to support all 
the chain actors. CFRC land was allocat-
ed to former state farm workers to raise 
dairy cows. A long-term land lease was 
granted to IDP for its investment in the 
large-scale farm and processing plant. 
Technical assistance has been provided 
through extension programs delivered 
by CFRC, HNLDC, and IDP to farm-
ers (concerning farming practices such 
as animal care, feeding, heat-stress con-
trol, etc.). Around 100 training courses 
were provided to 7,000 farmers between 
2000 and 2014. Furthermore, the local 
government also cares genuinely for 
the territorial identity of Ba-Vì milk by 
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applying for certification mark “Ba-Vì 
cow milk”, in 2009, as intellectual prop-
erty rights protection. The district gov-
ernment’s control over the certification 
mark aims at maintaining the quality 
and reputation of Ba-Vì milk; but re-
serving the mark rights for only two 
companies (IDP and BVM) may prevent 
other companies who are qualified from 
obtaining the certification mark and, to 
some extent, ensures IDP’s monopoly on 
collecting milk locally as IDP and BVM 
have partially merged.
Since 2012, the district dairy de-
velopment strategy appears to be close-
ly linked with the IDP development 
plan. Beyond the use of certification 
mark, the district government supports 
IDP in many institutionalized opera-
tions in the 5-year MOU. Together with 
the government’s favorable policies (ag-
ricultural insurance for producers14, 
favorable loans and taxation regimes, 
etc.), the district administration con-
trols the entrance of other dairy com-
panies by gauging daily collection ca-
pacity of minimum 600kg for placing 
collection points. This structural mech-
anism endeavors to a stable supply of 
milk to IDP and BVM.
Discussion and Conclusion
Structural transformation and 
organization of the value chain
As a snapshot of national dairy sector which has been expe-riencing a rise of medium 
14 The State provides grants to cover the insurance fees: 100% of insurance fees for poor farmers, 80% 
for quasi-poor farmers, 60% for non-poor farmers, and 20% for cooperative groups (who are part 
of a pilot project on livestock insurance).
and large farms, Ba-Vì district, in the 
2010-2014 period, witnessed a relevant 
change in farm size: decreasing number 
of small farms of 1-5 cows (from 89.55% 
to 61.17%), and increase in number of 
farms of more than 5 cows (farms of 
6-9 cows: from 8.14% to 32.17%; farms 
of more than 9 cows: from 2.31% to 
6.66%). Priority is given to the medi-
um and large farms in view of higher 
economic returns, better epidemic and 
quality control and improved effluence 
management. 
Despite the rapid structural 
changes in parts of the sector, small-
holders till dominate dairy production. 
Low entry barriers to production are set 
by both dairy processors and local gov-
ernment to ensure smallholder farmers 
access to credit, public services (ex-
tension and veterinary services), and 
training as well as improved infrastruc-
ture. Higher barriers concern land con-
straints, dependence on concentrates, 
demanding quality standards and per-
manent contracts with companies. 
Smallholder production shows more 
resilient against market fluctuations, 
but it is difficult to generate sufficient 
volume to meet increasing demand and 
face higher competition from import-
ed milk products. Accordingly, a niche 
marketing seems to be an important 
opportunity that help Ba-Vì milk over-
come barriers to trade (special demand 
for fresh milk, quality local product, 
local market for tourists, restaurants, 
etc.). Increasing domestic demand and 
improved roads would facilitate sale 
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of the products in the urban markets. 
Besides, technology is highlighted in 
transforming the chain and shaping 
the value chain governance (crossbred 
cows, new technology, and market dy-
namics such as prices). 
 
Governance structure and 
upgrading strategy
The governance of the value chain relies on very complex social networks including dairy pro-
ducers, collectors, processors, and pub-
lic authorities, and resulting from long 
historical processes. Informal relations 
play a crucial role alongside formal 
contracts in this regulation (Culas and 
Pannier 2014). Although IDP makes 
contracts with farmers and defines 
quality standards and prices (which are 
attributed to captive governance), col-
lectors are a key node between farmers 
and IDP, and the link between farm-
ers and collectors is embraced by rela-
tional governance. Captive governance 
emerges in relation with large-scale in-
vestments by IDP and quality manage-
ment objectives. Despite IDP’s attempts 
to introduce strong vertical coordina-
tion of the local chain, private collec-
tors have been able to maintain their 
position and keep some power in their 
relations with dairy farmers. Like dairy 
production in Son-La province, Ba-Vì 
dairy farmers suffer from a very weak 
professional organization, meaning 
they have very little bargaining power 
to negotiate the prices dictated by IDP 
(Bui et al. 2013; Nguyen et al. 2013). 
Hence, captive governance is parallel 
with chain upgrading, but it translates 
into an asymmetric sharing of incomes. 
Yet our data is lacking to assess wheth-
er contracted farmers earn more or less 
income than non-contracted ones, in 
particular through coercive measures 
on quality.
The investments made by IDP 
have had a major impact on the upgrad-
ing trajectory of the local value chain. 
Among the upgrading dimensions, 
vertical integration and upgrading of 
both processes and products appear to 
be the most significant changes. The 
capacity of IDP to invest in farmers’ 
development projects and in UHT pro-
cessing technology has provided new 
opportunities and value addition for 
farmers and for other small-scale pro-
cessors, through improved processing 
and packaging. The future of processing 
firms may depend on their capacity to 
set up contracts with appropriate incen-
tives. The role of the authorities in man-
aging the Ba-Vì certification trademark 
and milk quality control will certainly 
affect success chances of semi-industri-
al processing plants in the future. 
While the problems of melanine 
contamination in China are linked to 
the rapid and unregulated develop-
ment of the sector (Pei et al. 2011), a 
weak cooperation of firms in the Viet-
namese fast-growing dairy sector has 
led to new challenges and compro-
mised  the ability of the value chain to 
maintain the viable link among actors 
and food safety. The different forms 
of local collective organizations (the 
processor federation initiated by IDP, 
BVM and BVMC in 2013 to guarantee 
the quality of local dairy products, to 
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protect the interest of those concerns 
and to reduce risks; association of 14 
collectors in Tản-Lĩnh commune es-
tablished in 2013 aiming at mutual aid, 
strengthened solidarity, and limited 
competition among collectors) have no 
operational protocol to undertake their 
mission in reality. Meanwhile, the dairy 
farmer groups cannot perform collec-
tive actions. A national dairy manage- 
ment board encompassing different 
stakeholder representatives (produc-
ers, processors, state and consumers) 
is recommended to improve coordina-
tion between local actors and to han-
dle all emerging issues and conflicts of 
the value chain.
 
Value chain governance and 
territory governance
As Vinamilk, the biggest milk company in Vietnam, IDP and BVM rely on large supply net-
work of smallholder farmers and inter-
mediary collectors within a milkshed 
where milk is collected into a tank 
mixing milk from different producers. 
Bimonthly payment to farmers for de-
livered milk bases on the quality test 
done by the companies, while collec-
tors receive a collection fee. The cur-
rent decentralized collection system 
is beneficial to processors by reducing 
their investment, but is argued unfair 
and untransparent by both farmers and 
collectors since milk tests are done at 
the dairy plants and they have to accept 
the results and prices published by the 
companies. Such quality and payment 
system crystalize the tensions between 
farmers and processors; thus, an inde-
pendent quality test agency is crucial in 
stabilizing the dairy zone.
Dairy smallholders in Ba-Vi, 
like in other milksheds in Vietnam and 
other countries in the South, are fac-
ing challenges related to strengthened 
health regulations and increasing re-
source competition among operators 
that weakens the participation of small 
producers in the market. Innovations 
in the dairy industry, such as concep-
tion of new products manufactured in 
the territory (cheese for example), will 
allow small producers and processors 
to have easier market access, to diver-
sify their products and to increase their 
revenues. This would also help to meet 
other issues such as addressing season-
al fluctuations of milk products, lower 
costs to food, or the improvement of 
the quality of milk.
The recent strategy for eco-tour-
ism development of Hanoi to 2020-
2030 opens opportunities and chal-
lenges to the sustainable development 
of the dairy chain. From economic per-
spective, a fashion trend would be to 
create more diversity in dairy products 
and tours integrated with homestay at 
and visit to dairy farms. Community 
eco-tourism contributes to higher in-
come for the locals. From social per-
spective, with a strong territorial iden-
tity, the local chain should involve more 
the local farmers and artisanal and 
small processors. From environmental 
perspective, for the non-grazing dairy 
system characterized by the confine-
ment of animals, attention should be 
paid to effluence management and sus-
tainable development of the territory. 
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The current certification trade-
mark has contributed to the higher 
price of the local milk in the market. 
However, the upgrading to protected 
geographical indication (PGI) would 
be strategic in view of a stronger qual-
ity label as an integral attribute to the 
sustainability of the products in the 
market. Plus, PGI strategy will further 
valorize local natural resources, local 
know-how and the proactive partici-
pation of territorial organizations and 
actors to the sustainable and inclusive 
development
 
Institutional framework and 
enabling environment
Reardon et al. (2012) argued that the dynamics of the food chain in Asia is driven by economic 
development and public actions. Pub-
lic services contribute to the upgrading 
and modernization of the value chain. 
The MOU between IDP and district 
government (2009) and the processing 
plant built by IDP on the land of CFRC 
are outstanding examples of public-pri-
vate partnership in the agri-food sec-
tor. The Livestock Restructuring Plan 
(2014) converges with the Livestock 
Development Strategy (2008) in orient-
ing the focus of dairy production in tra-
ditional regions, including Ba-Vì. Apart 
from controlling imports of milk pow-
der and milk prices, the support pro-
vided by the State (technical assistance, 
credit, and building infrastructure) in-
centivizes dairy production, improves 
market connections and promotes mar-
ket integration. At the provincial and 
district levels, strong local government 
involvement is apparent in economic, 
technical, organizational and other an-
gles.  However, the definition of quali-
ty is not shared by all the actors in the 
chain.
Dairy industry, as a component 
of livestock sector is proved to be neg-
atively affected by increasing interna-
tional integration, notably TPP (VERP 
2015). Import of livestock and livestock 
products, especially dairy products, 
from countries of comparative advan-
tages (New Zealand, United States) is 
on rise. From the perspective of con-
sumers and importers, the dairy mar-
ket becomes more competitive after 
tariff removals, but it uncertainly could 
help domestic prices fall. While dairy 
(processed) products will suffer more 
from acute competition of imported 
products, raw milk can take advantage 
of natural trade barriers (i.e. perishabil-
ity of fresh milk). Competition pres-
sure mainly comes from powder milk. 
Short-term impact is not really clear, 
but to ensure the long run, it is nec-
essary to push sector restructuring to 
raise quality and competitiveness (dairy 
zoning, feed crop production, control 
over imported powder milk). Vietnam-
ese dairy enterprises have to invest into 
modern and advanced technology and 
sustain their market shares. Addition-
ally, given imprecise packaging regula-
tions and insufficient quality control as 
institutional bottlenecks (Pedregal and 
Nguyen 2009), it requires transparen-
cy in defining fresh milk, publicizing 
information of milk products to pro-
tect benefits consumers and businesses. 
Moreover, the prices of milk products 
must be under good control to ensure 
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the access of consumers to products of 
quality and of reasonable prices and to 
encourage enterprises to invest in milk 
production rather than being depen-
dent on imports
 
Policy implications
Our analysis highlights the role played by private companies and government intervention 
in promoting the dairy sector in Ba-Vì, 
which has emerged recently and un-
dergone a rapid transition. The context 
of the local dairy industry led to the 
emergence of three factors that influ-
ence transaction costs and hence shape 
a “mixed” type of governance needed 
to facilitate transactions along the lo-
cal dairy chain. The three factors are 
(i) the structure of the local dairy value 
chain, which is driven by private indus-
trial-scale processing companies; (ii) 
specific agricultural characteristics, and 
(iii) strong backstop of public services. 
Strong state involvement has taken dif-
ferent forms but is responsible for the 
initial impulses to the local dairy sector. 
Entry barriers to production and trade 
have increased significantly over time. 
The State uses the barriers by partner-
ing with private firms to facilitate the 
flows of products and information. 
Smallholder dairy farmers still have 
a role in local economy in the context 
of land constraint and livelihood as-
surance, but further support is needed 
to ensure their access to stable mar-
kets and help them understand quali-
ty and food safety regulations through 
training, improved support services 
and protection of intellectual property 
rights. These measures should be com-
bined with specific regulations aimed at 
preventing or reducing potential nega-
tive effects (exclusion of small produc-
ers and processors, environmental deg-
radation, unfair distribution of added 
value, market competition, etc.). Uni-
lateral decision making by the “captain” 
of the chain should be replaced by new 
rules of the game co-constructed with 
all the actors to ensure a sustainable and 
inclusive value chain. 
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